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THE APPORTIONMENT OF PROCEEDS FROM
DEPLETABLE NATURAL RESOURCES
HELD IN TRUST'
By ROBERT A. Wyum, JR.'
THE allocation of receipts2 from depletable natural resourcess held
in trust presents the discretionary trustee with a three pronged
dilemma. He must deal equitably with the present interest of the
tenant4 and the future interest of the remamdermanY He must operate
within the nebulous limits of his fiduciary discretion, and, from prac-
tical considerations, he must discharge his administrative duties as
simply as possible." In Califorma, the trustee clothed with discretionary
power with respect to the determination of principal, income and the
apportionment of receipts is protected by statute if he exercises has
discretionary power in good faith and according to his best judgment7
However, the vagueness of the statutory limitations placed upon the
fiduciary discretion of the trustee is implicit in the phrases "good faith"
and "best ]udgment." In order to protect himself from a charge that
he has acted beyond these il-defined limits and thus abused hIs dis-
cretion, the discretionary trustee has generally followed the apportion-
ment standard applicable where the settlor has neither granted dis-
Member, Second Year Class.
i The purpose of this comment is to analyze and evaluate Califorma's position with
respect to the duties of a trustee, the limitations on his power to apportion proceeds
between tenant and remainderman when the corpus is a depletable natural resource,
and the corresponding rights of the beneficianes in these proceeds. The discussion will
be limited to trusts in wnch the settlor, placing no duty on the trustee to convert the
wasting asset, (1) has neither specified a method for allocating receipts nor granted the
trustee discretion concerning distribution of proceeds, or (2) failed to specify a method
for allocation of the receipts, but left the method of distribution to the discretion of
the trustee.
2 Trust receipts are generally classed as principal if they represent a change in the
form of the corpus, or income if they represent a return from it.
8 The term "depletable natural resource" includes coal, oil, gas, and all other
natural metallic and nonmetallic deposits. These resources are distinguished from their
non-depletable counterparts, such as air and products derived from it, water, sod, dirt,
turf, mosses, and mineral products of the sea, in that the latter are, by their nature,
inexhaustible. INT. Rlv. CODE or 1954, § 613.
4 A tenant is "the person to whom income is presently or currently payable, or for
whom it is accumulated or who is entitled to the beneficial use of the principal presently
and for a time prior to its distribution." CAL. Civ. Co § 730.03.
5 A remainderman is "the person ultimately entitled to the principal "CAL.
Civ. CODE § 730.03.
6 Interview With Mr. H. B. Shultis, Vice President in charge of Trusts, Crocker-
Citizens National Bank, in San Francisco, Oct. 13, 1966.
7 CAL. Civ. CODE § 730.04.
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cretion, nor specified a method for allocating receipts, nor directed
that the asset be converted. 8 In such cases the trustee merely allocates
all rents, bonuses and royalties received from the exploitation of the
wasting corpus to rncome.9 While this conservative approach both
protects the trustee and permits simple and convenient trust admins-
tration, it is difficult to justify either as an equitable treatment of tenant
and remamderman, or as a fulfillment of the settlor's purpose and
intent. Since the trust corpus is a wasting asset, it is conceivable, and
not at all improbable, that the tenant, allowed all proceeds under the
statute, could deplete the corpus to extinction and thus seemingly
frustrate the intent of the settlor by leaving nothing for the remainder-
man.
Apparently recognizing the inequities in the present state of the
law, the California Supreme Court, in Estate of Bixby,1 approved a
trustee's allocation of 27 % of the gross oil royalty receipts, not to
exceed 50% of the net receipts, to principal, and a distribution of
the balance of the proceeds to the tenant as income.11 In this case,
the testator, after making provision for his widow, established identical
residuary trusts for the benefit of each of his four children for life.
His will further provided that, upon the death of. any beneficiary, the
corpus of his respective trust would go to augment the trust funds of
the surviving beneficiaries and upon the death of the last beneficiary,
the remaining trust corpus should be distributed to the then living
grandchildren of the testator. The principal assets of the respective
trusts were stock in the testator's ranch and oil royalty interests.
In reaching its decision, the court, citing Civil Code section 730.04,
found that the testator had empowered the trustee "to make deter-
minations contrary to 'existing law'-i.e., the provisions of the Principal
and Income Law characterizing the nature of trust receipts " by
investing it with the" 'power to determine what is principal and what
is income "' 2 They reasoned that the "purpose of the four trusts was
to preserve a substantial or major part of his [testator's] trust estate
for his lineal descendents beyond his four children [T]he Trustee's
allocation to principal was in accordance with a reasonable construc-
tion of the testator's intent, and not contrary to it, and was not an
abuse of its discretion for this reason."18
8 Interwew With Mr. H. B. Shultis, Vice President in charge of Trusts, Crocker-
Citizens National Bank, in San Francisco, Oct. 13, 1966.
9 CAL. Cry. CoDE 730.11(1).
1055 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 362 P.2d 43 (1961).
Ii This is essentially the same standard of apportionment adopted by the Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962, and incorporated into the Revised Uniform
Principal and Income Act § 9(a)(3), (9B UiNwonm LAws ANNOTATTm 580 (1966))
(hereinafter cited as Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act).
12 55 Cal. 2d 819, 823, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 413, 362 P.2d 43, 45 (1961).
13 Id. at 824, 13 Cal. Rptr. at 414, 362 P.2d at 46.
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But while this decision recognizes one of the problems facing a
trustee clothed with discretionary powers concerning the determina-
tion of principal and income, it still leaves important questions unre-
solved. For example, does the decision establish an upper limit on the
discretion which a trustee may reasonably exercise, and thereby ex-
pand the area in which he may safely operate, or is it merely judicial
approval of the discretion exercised with respect to the facts in point?
Does it represent a judicial attempt to legislate a change into the
present California law as to apportionment of proceeds from depletable
natural resources held in trust? Would such a standard permit simple,
convenient trust adminstration and, at the same time, provide equit-
able treatment of the beneficiaries? Such questions may best be re-
solved through an examination of the trust relationship, the nature of
the depletable trust corpus and the common-law background of
apportionment.
THE TRUST RELATIONSHIP 14
In California, two types of trusts are recognized by statute;"5 the
voluntary1 and the involuntary17 trust. The involuntary trust is created
by operation of law18 and the rights of the beneficiaries are "absolutely
fixed and determined by law "' A voluntary trust, on the other hand,
is an express trust, created through either an inter vivos or testamentary
act2 The instrument2' creating the trust must evidence an intention
on the part of the settlor to create a trust, and specify its subject, pur-
pose and beneficiaries. 2
The directions for administration, however, need not be explicitly
delineated. Often the settlor's desired administrative policies are quite
unclear, and only implicitly evident from the instrument construed
14 For extended discussions on the background of the trust concept, see 4 Powm_,
REAL PRoERTY ff 500-03 (1965); 1 Scotr, TRUSTS §§ 1.1-.11 (2d ed. 1956); BoGEiT,
TRuSTS AND TausTrEs §§ 1-7 (2d ed. 1965).
1 5 CAL. Cv. CODE' § 2215.
16 CAL. Civ. CODE § 2216.
17 CAL. Cirv. CODE § 2217.
iS Fulton v. Jansen, 99 Cal. 587, 34 Pac. 331 (1893) (dictum); Ombaun v. Main,
198 Cal. App. 2d 92, 17 Cal. Rptr. 631 (1961); Atwood v. Elwood, 132 Cal. App. 2d
761, 283 P.2d 43 (1955).
19 Eley's Appeal, 103 Pa. 300, 307 (1883) (dictum); Wells Fargo Bank Am. Trust
Co. v. Greuner, 226 Cal. App. 2d 454, 38 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1964). And see CaL. Civ.
CODE §§ 2223-24, 2243, 2275.
20 See BEsTATM T (SEcoND), TRUSTS § 17 (1959).
21 Natural resources, before severance, are considered real property. Therefore,
where the trust corpus is composed of this type asset, California Civil Code § 852 is
controlling and the trust must be created by an instrument in writing.
22 CAL. CIV. CODE § 2221.
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as a whole.23 When construing a trust document, the courts will look
to the intent of the settlor, for such is the controlling consideration
in determining the rights between the tenant, remainderman and
trustee.24 But again, the intent of the settlor is not always specifically
stated, or, if stated, its expression is many times ambiguous. 25 When
doubt arises, the intent and purpose of the settlor is resolved from
the trust mstrument 6 taken by "the four comers" and construed in
'"ight of the dominant dispositive plan."
27
Of course, where the settlor specifically advises the trustee as to
the method of administration, the problem of discretionary allocation
of proceeds does not arise. But in such cases the trustee, while free
from the allocation problem, is often faced with the more pervasive
problem engendered by a rigid administrative policy. Too little flex-
ibility may cause a frustration of the expressed purposes of the settlor.
Therefore, to provide the needed flexibility, settlors have leaned
toward granting trustees discretionary powers.2 8 Such grants, by plac-
23 See Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 362 P.2d 43 (1961);
In re Hopkins' Estate, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
2-Doty v. Conmissioner, 148 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1945); Estate of Thompson, 50
Cal. 2d 613, 328 P.2d 1 (1958); Estate of Ferrall, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009
(1953); Ephrann v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 28 Cal. 2d 824, 172 P.2d 501 (1946);
Moxley v. Title Ins. & Trust Co., 27 Cal. 2d 457, 165 P.2d 15 (1945); Estate of Gross,
216 Cal. App. 2d 563, 31 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1963); Dumame v. Dumame, 301 Mass. 214,
16 N.E.2d 625 (1938).
25 A typical situation is one in which the settlor directs that the income be paid
to the tenant, but does not expressly state whether income means total proceeds or
proceeds less, amortization deduction. See Estate of Heard, 107 Cal. App. 2d 225, 236
P.2d 810 (1951); In re Hopkins' Estate, 171 Misc. 910, 14 N.Y.S.2d 71 (Surr. Ct. 1939).
26 Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Duffill, 191 Cal. 629, 218 Pac. 14 (1923). In the Duffill
case the court found that "in seeking the true construction of a declaration of trust,
the guiding principle must be the intention of the settlor-lhs intention as ex-
pressed. The only intention [a court] is authorized to declare is such as
may be deduced from an interpretation of the instrument which was drawn and executed
by the parties to express their intention " Title Ins. & Trust Co. v. Duflill, supra
at 642, 218 Pac. at 18; Estate of Greenleaf, 101 Cal. App. 2d 658, 225 P.2d 945
(1951); Sears v. Childs, 309 Mass. 337, 35 N.E.2d 663 (1941).
27 Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 892, 206 P.2d 360, 365 (1949). In criticizing
the ma]ority opiion, however, Justice Edmonds pointed out that "to lift the document
'by its four comers' and construe it according to its 'general scheme', allows a court to
reach any desired result by reciting generalities and stating a positive, if unexplained,
conclusion therefrom. Such a rule of construction leads to the disposition of property in
such a manner as a majority of the judges may determine most fully accords with their
views " as to whom the distributee should be. Id. at 894, 206 P.2d at 366.
28 Courts sometimes confuse the meaning of the term discretionary trust and apply
it to trusts in which the settlor merely grants discretionary powers to his trustee.
In the discretionary trust the trustee has absolute power with respect to the payment
or application of trust income or capital to or for a named beneficiary or beneficiaries.
He is subject to censure by the courts only when his acts are contrary to the overlying
purpose and intent of the settlor. The trustee with discretionary powers, on the other
hand, has a more limited field in which he may exercise his discretion. In such trusts the
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ing someone with judgment in the chair of decision, provide a means
for offsetting detrimental changes in external conditions with ameliora-
tive changes in administrative policy-an alternative more desirable
than strict adherence to an ofttimes obsolete and ineffectual admimstra-
tive policy laid out by a settlor at the creation of the trust.2 But the
extent to which the trustee may exercise his discretion to make these
ameliorative changes depends upon the limits of that discretion as
construed by the courts,30 for the indefinite statutory terms l give the
trustee at best only a vague definition of permissible conduct. How-
ever, the trustee may not act arbitrarily or capriciously, 2 and the
courts, in construing the discretionary grant, will again look to the
intent of the settlor, be it expressed in an inter vivos declaration of
trust or a Will,A and limit the trustee to an exercise of his discretion
in a manner consistent with that intent.0 4
settlor will usually grant the trustee discretionary power with respect to certain matters
(e.g., apportionment of proceeds) but specifically direct him to do some other act(s) of
administration. See BOGEPT, 'ThusTs AND TnUsTEES § 228 (2d ed. 1965); 4 PowEL ,
PmAL PaopEaTv ff 559 (1965); 2 Scot, TusTs § 128.3 (2d ed. 1956).
29 See Doty v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1945). The court took
notice of "the difficulties of a settlor of a trust in stating his intention so as to anticipate
future contingencies. " They further pointed out that the discretionary device
allowed for "a readjustment of distributions between the conflicting interests of the
life beneficiaries and the remaindermen " so as to "conform more closely to the
expressed purposes of the settlor." Id. at 507. See also Note, What Amounts To An
Exercise of Discretion In a Discretionary Trust?, 43 IowA. L. REv. 626 (1958).
30 1n some jurisdictions, the grant of discretion to a trustee means simply that he
will have the power to exercise his judgment only in situations where there is honest
doubt, but honest doubt is considered not to exist where there is settled law. A decision
that is not consistent with settled law, then, would be termed an abuse of discretion.
See In re Talbot's Will, 170 Misc. 138, 9 NY.S.2d 806 (Surr. Ct. 1939); American
Security & Trust Co. v. Frost, 117 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 707
(1941); Commissioner v. O'Keeffe, 118 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1941); Commissioner v.
Waterbury, 97 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1938), cert. dented, 305 U.S. 638 (1938).
Other courts hold that discretionary power, where conferred, is intended to enable
the trustee to ignore the local rules of construction in the allocation of trust receipts.
The trustee is not limited to situations where "there is a question of doubt or no rule of
law to guide him." Dumame v. Dumame, 301 Mass. 214, 222, 16 N.E.2d 625, 630
(1938). And see White v. Rose, 73 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1934); Colt v. Duggan, 25 F
Supp. 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Sears v. Childs, 309 Mass. 337, 35 NXE.2d 663 (1941).
81 CAL. Civ. CoDE § 2228 ("highest good faith"); CAL. Cxv. CoDE § 2261 ("reason-
able prudence"); CAL. Civ. CODE § 2259 ("ordinary care").
82 Doty v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 503 (1st Cir. 1945); Home v. Title Ins. &
Trust Co., 79 F Supp. 91 (S.D. Cal. 1948); Estate of Miller, 230 Cal. App. 2d 888,
41 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1964). The court pointed out "that the discretion given to a trustee
is never unlimited or arbitrary, such as ight be exercised by an oriental prince out of
the Arabian Nights, sitting at the city gate and exercising his own uncontrolled whim
as to what is appropriate and just." Id. at 907, 41 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
83 Brock v. Hall, 33 Cal. 2d 885, 889, 206 P.2d 360, 363 (1949). See Estate of
Starr, 203 Cal. App. 2d 638, 21 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1962).
84Estate of Ferrall, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009 (1953); Estate of Miller, 230
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California, by statute 5 and ]udicial decision,36 draws a qualitative
distinction between "extended discretion," described by superlatives
such as "absolute," "uncontrolled," or "sole," and "simple discre-
tion" described by less exclusive adjectives.87 The case law indicates
that under a grant of extended discretion, the trustee's decisions "can-
not be reviewed or controlled by any other person or tribunal on con-
sideration going to the soundness of the judgment exercised by hm, 8
but his decisions "may be attacked for fraud or bad faith." 9 In the
absence of fraud or bad faith, the court may still interfere if it finds
that the trustee acted "in a state of mind not contemplated by the
settlor."40 On the other hand, when the trustee is granted merely sim-
ple discretion, he will be held to the exercise of reasonable judgment.4i
Because of the nebulous limits of fiduciary discretion, the discre-
tionary trustee generally has taken a conservative approach when faced
with the allocation of trust receipts.4 2 This policy,43 as mentioned
Cal. App. 2d 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1964); Estate of Lackinann, 156 Cal. App. 2d
674, 320 P.2d 186 (1958); Estate of Greenleaf, 101 Cal. App. 2d 658, 225 P.2d
945 (1951).
35"A discretionary power conferred upon a trustee is presumed not to be left to
his arbitrary discretion, but may be controlled by the proper court if not reasonably
exercised, unless an absolute discretion is clearly conferred by the declaration of trust."
CAL. Cry. CODE § 2269. (Emphasis added.)
86Estate of Gross, 216 Cal. App. 2d 563, 31 Cal. Rptr. 281 (1963); Estate of
Traung, 207 Cal. App. 2d 818, 24 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1962); Estate of Heard, 107 Cal.
App. 2d 225, 236 P.2d 810 (1951); Estate of Canfield, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 181 P.2d
732 (1947).
87See Halbach, Problems of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 CoLum. L. REv.,
1425 (1961).
8 8 Neel v. Barnard, 24 Cal. 2d 406, 417, 150 P.2d 177, 183 (1944). See Estate
of Traung, 207 Cal. App. 2d 818, 24 Cal. Rptr. 872 (1962); Estate of Heard, 107
Cal. App. 2d 225, 236 P.2d 810 (1951); Estate of Canfleld, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 181
P.2d 732 (1947); Campbell v. Folsom, 70 Cal. App. 2d 309, 160 P.2d 906 (1945).
39 Campbell v. Folsom, 70 Cal. App. 2d 309, 312, 160 P.2d 906, 908 (1945).
40RESTA.TEMENT (SEcoND), TRu7sTs § 187, comment 1 (1959). But see Halbach,
supra note 37, at 1431. Dean Halbach queries whether or not it is accurate to state that
reasonableness will not be required of a trustee clothed with extended discretion, and
suggests instead that such powers are simply more difficult to abuse, pointing out that
"no case has been found that actually supports, on its facts, the Restatement view
that the requirement of reasonableness is dispensed with by such a provision." Id. at
1431 (citing Estate of Ferrall, 41 Cal. 2d 166, 258 P.2d 1009 (1953)).
41Estate of Canfield, 80 Cal. App. 2d 443, 181 P.2d 732 (1947).
42 lnterview With Mr. H. B. Shultis, Vice President m charge of Trusts, Crocker-
Citizens National Bank, in San Francisco, Oct. 13, 1966.
43 Dean Halbach recognizes a conservative tendency on the part of the discretionary
trustee but, in contrast, finds its expression in underpayment to the present income
beneficiary. The obvious reason for this he says is that "underpayment, m the absence
of such serious abuse or bad faith as to warrant the trustees removal, would result
merely in the present beneficiary's obtaining a court order directing increased distribu-
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above, both protects the trustee from the possibility of ]udicial re-
versal44 and permits simple and conveient trust administration, but
it is difficult to justify as either an equitable treatment of tenant and
remainderman or as a fulfillment of the settlor's overlying intent.4 5 In
order to facilitate equitable treatment of the beneficiaries and fulfill-
ment of the settlor's general purpose, limits within which the trustee
may safely operate must be established. Thus, the problem of appor-
tionment concerns the determination of what constitutes an exercise
of reasonable judgment with respect to the allocation of proceeds
between present and future beneficiaries of depletable trust corpora.
Such determinations obviously require an understanding of the nature
of the depletable trust corpus.
THE NATURE OF THE DEPLETABLE TRUST CORPUS
The principal value of a trust corpus consisting of a depletable
natural resource is in the economic exploitation of the mineral deposit.
However, the worth of the corpus will be greatly diminished or de-
stroyed through such exploitation unless allowance is made for deple-
tion40 through the maintenance of an amortization fund. This becomes
tions from the fund remaining in the hands of the trustee." Halbach, supra note 37,
at 1427.
While this may generally be true, it would seem that it is not the case in California
with respect to the distribution of proceeds from depletable trust corpora. Instead, as
pointed out by Mr. Shultis, the conservative administrative policies of trustees have
leaned toward overpayment of the present income beneficiary. The reason is that under
Civil Code § 730.11(1), the trustee without discretion or specific direction from the
settlor must allocate all receipts from the exploitation of the wasting corpus to income.
Therefore, the reasoning has been that if discretion is exercised m accordance with this
provision, it certainly will not be determined unreasonable. The lack of litigation con-
cerning overpayment seems to indicate the safety in such a policy. In fact, in recent
years, the principal cases litigated in California as to distribution of proceeds from
wasting mineral trust corpora were both suits by the tenant charging underpayment.
See Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 362 P.2d 43 (1961) and
Estate of Sloan, 222 Cal. App. 2d 283, 35 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1963).
44 Halbach, supra note 37, at 1428.
45 Professor Richard R. B. Powell notes that such treatment "disregards" the
settlor's reasonable, and often existent, intent both to have the wasting asset retained
and to have the current receipts apportioned so that each successive taker shall enjoy
the same quantum of wealth." 4 Pow l_, REAL Pno wTr 11 555, at 347 n.3 (1965).
And see 3 ScoTT, TRusTs § 241.4 (2d ed. 1956).
46"Depletion is the using up of natural resources by the process of mining (as
in the case of coal, metals, and other minerals), quarrying (as in the case of stone),
drilling (as in the case of oil and gas), and felling (as in the case of timber)." 4 CCH
1967 STAND. FED. TAx RFP. ff 3508. Here, however, we are concerned not only with
physical depletion, the using up of the natural resource comprising the corpus of the
trust, but also with econome depletion, the using up of the trust principal. Thus, physical
depletion may occur without the detrimental effects of econonne depletion if the
corpus is amortized, e.g., if the form of the asset is changed and reinvested.
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more apparent when it is observed that part of the return from the
exploitation of the mineral deposit is not really income, but represents
merely a change in the form of the corpus. 47 If the tenant were allowed
to take all the proceeds from the sale of the extracted minerals, the
result could be "such depletion and impairment of the corpus as to
leave it as a skeleton or ghost for the remamdermen." 48 If, on the other
hand, the proceeds are distributed entirely to principal and the tenant
allowed only the interest from the investment, it is probable that both
the intention of the settlor and the purpose of the trust would be de-
feated.49 However, these two extremes, one favoring the tenant at
the expense of the remamderman and the other, conversely, favoring
the remamderman at the expense of the tenant, are products of cen-
turies of evolution in the common-law courts.
The origin of the law concerning present and future interest rights
in minerals lies in the common law of waste. At common law it was
furmly established that the intent of the grantor of the interest deter-
mined the rights of those taking from him, whether the interest granted
was legal or equitable.50 This led to the promulgation of the "open
mine" doctrine, by which a legal life tenant was given the right to
exhaust any resource tapped prior to the creation of his estate.5' The
courts inferred that grantors, by tapping the resources during their
ownership, intended that such be treated as fruits of the soil to be
used to extinction.52 The common law, however, made no apportion-
ment with respect to successive interests. The rule was simple: If the
mine were already opened, the proceeds were treated wholly as in-
come; if unopened, they were treated wholly as principal.3
474 PowELL, REAL PRoPEaTY ff .555, at 345 (1965).
48 White v. Blackman, 168 S.W.2d 531, 534 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942) (dictum). This
case involved a life tenancy by right of homestead.
49 Since the proceeds do not represent only income, conversely, they do not represent
only principal and to treat them as such would be an mjustice to the tenant.
GO "The grantor was absolute master of his property, and could carve the lands
which were the subject of his grant into such estates and interests as he pleased." Dash-
wood v. Magmac, [1891] 3 Ch. 306, 360 (dictum).
51 "As early as the time of Coke it was established law that open mines could be
worked by a possessor having an estate for life or for years, even to exhaustion; but that
no new mines could be opened." 5 PowELL, REAL PnopEaTy g 640, at 17 (1965) (citing
Coke, Littleton 53a (18th ed. 1823)). And see Dashwood v. Magmac, [1891] 3 Ch.
306, 360 where Bowen, L.J., states that "the open mine is an instance, beginning in
the Roman, but familiar already to the English law as far back as the reign of Edward
1H." In Eley's Appeal, 103 Pa. 300, 307 (1883), the court stated "the right to operate
previously opened mines, and work the same even to exhaustion, cannot be questioned."
This case involved a testamentary trust.
52 "The reason for the general rule applicable to opened mines is that in such
cases mining is a mere mode of use and enjoyment fixed by the owner, and to extract
the minerals is but to take the accruing profits from the land." Daniels v. Charles, 172
Ky. 238, 241-42, 189 S.W 192, 194 (1916).
53 BoGEaT, TRUSTS Amu TnusTEEs § 827, at 437 (2d ed. 1965); 3 ScoTr, TRusTs
§ 239.3, at 1865 (2d ed. 1956).
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While this is still basically the law,54 it is not uniformly applied in
all jurisdictions because the term "opened" has undergone a process
of extension from its original literal interpretation to the extended
definitions, accepted in varying degrees in the different jurisdictions.
The first step in the extension of the open mine doctrine recognized
a right in the life tenant to lease previously opened mines. The courts
reasoned that if the tenant could exploit an open mine to exhaustion,
then he certainly could lease it to exhaustion.5" The common-law courts
next stretched the doctrine to include situations where the prior owner
leased mineral deposits, but where the same were not physically
opened until commencement of the limited owner's estate. Here they
reasoned that
[a] mine lawfully leased to be opened is an "open mine," within the
reason of the rule . . ; and when lawfully opened and worked...
during the time that the freehold estate of the life tenant continues,
the profits issuing therefrom, thus lawfully severed and produced, be-
long of right to him; for the term "profit" in law, comprehends the
produce of the soil, whether it arise above or below the surface, in-
cluding product of mines, as well as herbage growing on the surface.56
As a further extension, the open mine doctrine was held to apply
when the trustee was clothed with the power to sell or lease the trust
corpus, even though the mineral deposits had not been physically
opened or leased by the settlor.57 From here the doctrine reached its
ultimate extension with little difficulty. In its extreme expression the
tenant enjoys the right to exploit the mineral deposits to exhaustion
where no contrary intent can be attributed to the settlor. s
In 1941, the California legislature, adopted the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, and, subordinating equitable treatment of the bene-
ficiaries to administrative ease, incorporated the extended open mine
apportionment standard as a modification to section nine of the Act.59
54E.g., Mairs v. Central Trust Co., 127 W. Va. 795, 34 S.E.2d 742 (1945). See
collected cases 18 A.L.R.2d 98 (1951), listing the following states as recognizing the
open mine doctrine: Arkansas, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont,
Virginia, and West Virginia.
55 Westmoreland Coal Co.'s Appeal, 85 Pa. 344 (1877); Irwin v. Covode, 24 Pa.
162 (1854); Spencer v. Scurr, 31 Beav. 334, 54 Eng. Rep. 1167 (1862).
56 Koen v. Bartlett, 41 W. Va. 559, 567, 23 S.E. 664, 666 (1895).
57 Bruner's Will, 363 Pa. 552, 70 A.2d 222 (1950); In re Knox's Estate, 328 Pa.
177, 195 Ad. 28 (1937); Bedford's Appeal, 126 Pa. 117, 17 AtI. 538 (1889) (inter
vivos trust); McClintock v. Dana, 106 Pa. 386 (1884); Eley's Appeal, 103 Pa. 300
(1883). Contra, Mairs v. Central Trust Co., 127 W. Va. 795, 34 S.E.2d 742 (1945).
58 In re Wernet's Estate, 61 Ohio App. 304, 22 N.E.2d 490 (1938) (testamentary
trust); but see In re McFadden's Estate, 224 Pa. 443, 73 Atl. 927 (1909) (testamentary
trust).
59 "Where any part of the principal consists of property in lands from which may
be taken timber, minerals, oils, gas or other natural resources, and the trustee or tenant
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Tins standard, however, is no more inequitable than its counterpart,
the unopened mine rule, which directs all proceeds to principal and
allows the tenant only the interest earned on remvestment. 0 In either
case the proceeds are disproportionately distributed, favoring one
beneficiary at the expense of the other. Therefore, it would appear
that the proper standard for allocating receipts from a wasting asset
must-lie somewhere between these extremes.
Statutory Apportionment
Probably the first significant recognition of the inequity arising in
the treatment of receipts from wasting assets wholly as income came
in the related field of tax law 61 In response to the inequity, the federal
government, in 1913, permitted the operator of a wasting asset to
deduct from the gross proceeds "a reasonable allowance for depletion
of ores and all other natural deposits, not to exceed 5 per centum of
the gross value at the mine of the output for the year for wich the
computation is made. "62 By 1918, operators of mineral deposits
in possession is not under a duty to change the form of the investment of the principal,
or (the duty to change the form of the investment being absent) is authorized by law
or by the terms of the transaction by which the principal was established, to lease or
otherwise develop such natural resources, and no provision is- made for the disposition
of the net proceeds thereof after the payment of expenses and carrying charges on such
property, such proceeds shall be deemed income, whether received as rent or bonus
on a lease or as a consideration, by way of royalties or otherwise for the permanent
severance of such natural resources from the lands. A duty to change the form of the
investment shall be negatived, and authority to develop such natural resources shall be
deemed to exist (not excluding other cases where appropriate intent is manifested)
where (a) the resources or the right to exploit them is specifically devised or granted,
or (b) where development or exploitation of the resources had begun prior to the trans-
action by which the principal was established, or (c) where by the terms of that
transaction a general authority to lease or otherwise develop is conferred, or (d) where
the lands are directed to be retained. The fact that such property where held in trust
and received from the testator or settlor does not fall within the category of investments
which the trustee would be authorized to make under the law or the terms of the particu-
lar trust, nor the conferring of a mere authority, as distinguished from a direction, to
sell such property, shall not be deemed to evidence an intent that the form of the
investment shall be changed." CAL. Civ. Co § 730.11(1).
1o See Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198 (1878); Blakeley v. Marshall, 174 Pa. 425,
34 AUt. 564 (1889). (See note 54 supra for Pennsylvania cases following the open mine
rule.)
61 The need for a depletion allowance with respect to income tax on the proceeds
from a wasting asset can be seen in the following situation: Taxpayer T buys the right to
exploit a mineral asset for $1,000,000. The expected yield from the deposit is $1,200,000.
Without the depletion deduction, T, if a corporation, would pay at least $600,000 taxes
on the return of $1,200,000 (the corporate tax rate being generally in excess of 50%).
Adding to the $1,000,000 original outlay the $600,000 tax assessment, and subtracting
the $1,200,000 yield, T has undergone a loss of $400,000. See Borden, Taxation of
Mineral Properties, in EcoNmnocs OF THE MxnERAL INusmrns 463 (2d ed. Robie 1964).
6238 Stat. 172-73 (1913).
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were allowed to calculate depletion deductions by either the cost or
the discovery method.63 Applying the former method, capitalization
was allowed to the extent of the original capital outlay, whereas by
the latter method, the operator could capitalize to the extent of the
fair market value of the deposit within thirty days of discovery. 4 In
1926, Congress retained both cost and discovery methods for calculat-
ing depletion deductions with respect to mines, but, with respect to
oil and gas wells, the discovery method was abandoned and a per-
centage standard was adopted as an approximation to it.66 Under this
latter method, 6 operators of oil and gas deposits were given a deple-
tion allowance of 271/2% of the gross income not to exceed 50% of the
net income. In 1932, the government extended the right to depletion
on a percentage of receipts to operators of metal (15%), coal (5%),
and sulphur (23%) mines, with all limited to 50% of net receipts.68
Today percentage depletion applies to over 100 enumerated minerals,
and may be applied to any other minerals which qualify under the
general provisions of the statute.69
These present day depletion allowances have been criticized as
tax subsidies for a minority of the taxpayers,70 and from all appear-
ances, such criticism is not entirely without merit. The criticism, how-
ever, does not go to the concept of the depletion allowance, but, in-
stead, only to its application. In their inception, these allowances were
6340 Stat. 1078-79 (1918).
64 Both the cost and discovery methods of calculating the depletion of the asset
are similar to the depreciation procedure applied to machinery, etc. The discovery
method of capitalization merely increases the basis from the actual original capital
outlay as used in the cost procedure, to the fair market value within thirty days of
discovery. See an example of the cost procedure note 71 infra.
0544 Stat. 16, 27, 42 (1926).
66 By the percentage method of depletion the operator of the wasting asset is allowed
to calculate his deduction by multiplying his gross returns by a specified percentage,
e.g., 27Y% for oil.
67 This standard was designed to operate in lieu of discovery depletion allowances
so as to provide approximately the same results as though every barrel produced came
from a discovered property. The Joint Staff on Internal Revenue, L. H. Parker, chairman,
studied all discovery valuation cases on record and, averaging their findings for each
ease, concluded that discovery depletion deductions on a barrel of discovered oil aver-
aged 32% of the gross yield of a barrel of crude. The Senate then recommended a deple-
tion allowance of 30%. The House Ways and Means Committee countered with a
recommendation of 25%. In a compromise, they agreed on a depletion allowance of
27Y7% of the gross income not to exceed 50% of the net. Borden, Taxation of Mineral
Properties, in EcoNowncs oF THE MImNEAL INusTanEs 463 (2d ed. Robie 1964). See
Freeman, Per Centage Depletion For Oil: A Policy Issue, 30 IND. L.J. 399 (1954) for
an extended discussion.
6 47 Stat. 181, 202-03 (1932).
69 See INT. BEv. CODE OF 1954, § 613 for the various depletion deductions in effect
today.
70 Freeman, Per Centage Depletion For Oil: A Policy Issue, 30 IND. L.J. 399 (1954).
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merely intended to remedy the gross inequities inherent in labeling
proceeds from mineral deposits exclusively income, but in application
they have overrun rather than cured the malady. But, since similar
inequities prevail in the area of mineral trust receipt apportionment,
the various tax depletion standards should prove useful in determining
the proper standard for allocation of trust receipts.
Depletion as a Basis of Apportionment of Trust Proceeds
When drawing an analogy from tax depletion standards to appor-
tionment of trust proceeds, itis important to note that, of the several
methods of calculating income tax depletion deductions, only the cost
method gives the actual depletion of the wasting asset.71 This is readily
71 To determine the amount of depletion by the cost method, the total number of
units remaining as of the year for which the computation is being made (e.g., tons of
ore, barrels of oil, board feet of timber) is first estimated. (Often because of development
worl, etc., the periodic estimate of recoverable units will be materially different from
the estimate used for the prior period and, in such case, this new estimate is used in
calculating depletion). This estimated number of units remaining is then divided into
the adjusted basis, determined by subtracting depletion to date plus salvage value, from
the original cost of the wasting asset, and the quotient, then, represents the unit deple-
tion allowance or deduction. This unit depletion deduction is then multiplied by the
number of units sold during the period for which the depletion is being calculated with
the result representing the total depletion deduction allowable for the year. In appor-
tioning proceeds, this amount is credited to the principal account since it represents a
change in the form of the corpus, and the balance of the proceeds is distributed to the
present income beneficiaries. Example: S buys a wasting mineral asset for $11,000 and
estimates indicate that it contains 100,000 recoverable units (e.g., tons of coal). In the
first year 12,000 tons are mined and 10,000 sold. Assuming a salvage value (property
value after extraction of all minerals) of $1,000, depletion calculations are as follows:
Amt. to be capitalized = original cost less salvage value
= $11,000 - $1,000
= $10,000
Amat. to be capitalized






Depletion for the year = Depletion Rate X tons sold
= $0.10 X 10,000
= $1,000
Therefore, in apportioning proceeds by means of the cost method, $1,000 would be sub-
tracted from the net receipts, and placed in an amortization fund for the remainderman.
(Note: the receipts considered here are only those obtained through exploitation of the
wasting asset.)
If it is assumed that at the end of the following year, revised estimates indicate
165,000 units remaining, production increased during that year to 13,000 tons, and sales
totaled 15,000 tons (the two thousand tons mined but not sold the year before are
sold with the present year's production), depletion calculations for the succeeding period
would be as follows:
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apparent when it is recognized that the cost method allows recovery
of only the capital investment pro rata over the productive life of the
resource. Both discovery and its ultimate successor, percentage deple-
tion, were designed to provide a stimulus toward development of
natural resources in addition to returning the operator's capital invest-
ment.72 By analogy, then, these methods would not only apportion the
actual depletion of the asset to principal, but also part of the income.
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1962, incorporated
a percentage standard (evidently derived from the percentage tax
depletion standard applicable to oil and gas) into section 9(a) (3) of
the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act.73 This standard, how-
ever, applies not only to oil and gas, but to all other natural resources,
with the exception of timber,74 subject instead to a cost standard, and,
of course, the non-depletable natural resources. By this standard,
271/2% of the gross receipts, not to exceed 50% of the net receipts, are
apportioned to principal, as a depletion allowance, and the balance is
distributed to the income beneficiary.75 As pointed out above, this
was the same standard used in the Bixby70 case.
Est. recoverable units
at beginning 2d year = Est. recoverable units at end 2d year + units





Amt. remaining to be
capitalized = Original cost less (salvage
value + depletion to date)
= $11,000-($1,000 + $1,000)
- $ 9,000
New rate of depletion Ant. rem. to be capitalized
per ton
Est. recov. units beg. 2d yr.
$ 9,000
180,000
- $0.05 per ton
Depletion for 2d yr. = Rate/ton X tons sold
= $0.05 X 15,000
= $750
Thus, the cost method merely converts the form of the corpus.
7
2 Freeman, Per Centage Depletion For Oil: A Policy Issue, 30 Ibm. L.J. 399 (1954);
Borden, Taxation of Mineral Properties, in EcoNoMIcs OF T=e MINERAL INDUsTaIEs 463
(2d ed. Robie 1964).
73 The Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act, § 9, was patterned after the
Texas Trust Act (TEx. REv. Cxv. STAT. A T. 7425b-33 (1960)). This latter Act was in
turn modeled after the federal depletion allowance provisions.
74 IEsvn UNrrons. pramca[AL AND INcom AcT § 10.
75Id. § 9.
16 Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 362 P.2d 43 (1961).
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Although it is unclear whether the decision in Bixby was a judicial
attempt to legislate the standard into California law, or merely an
approval of the trustee's discretion as exercised with respect to the
particular facts in point, it would seem certain that the decision would
influence subsequent discretionary allocations by other trustees toward
the direction of the percentage standard. Therefore, in the interest of
both trustee and beneficiary, a comparative analysis of the various
standards of apportionment would seem to be in order. The proper
criteria for such an examination would appear to lie at the heart of
the trustee's dilemma, namely, (1) whether or not the standard treats
the beneficiaries equitably, (2) whether or not it establishes limits
within which the trustee may safely exercise his discretion, and (3)
whether or not it is consistent with simple, convenient trust administra-
tion.
TRUST RECEIPT APPORTIONMENT STANDARDS
Of the standards to be analyzed, two are creatures of statute-the
percentage and the cost standards-and two are products of the
common law-the open mine, and its antithesis, the unopened mine
standards. This latter standard which allows the tenant only the inter-
est gained from reinvestment of the mineral proceeds, is based upon
the theory that the sale of minerals, is, in effect, a sale of part of the
land or corpus of the trust.77 The receipts, then, represent principal to
be reinvested, and the tenant, as income beneficiary, is entitled to the
interest earned thereon. As in the case of its counterpart, the open
mine rule, this standard would do little to establish limits on permissible
deviations from it. The same generalization would seem to hold true for
both the cost and the percentage standards, and, the reason for ineffec-
tiveness in either of the cases, would be the failure of the standards to
expressly delineate areas of permissible deviation. A trustee subject
to the qualitative limits determined by the judicial construction of
the settlor's grant of discretion, would be more apt to take a conserva-
tive approach and thus apportion proceeds as per the letter of the
standard rather than exercise his discretion in the nebulous area sur-
rounding the standard and thereby chance the possibility of judicial
reversal.78 The effect, then, of any of the four standards would appear
to be a partial extinguishment of discretion, contrary to the obvious
intent of the settlor in granting discretionary powers to the trustee.
Therefore, not only must there be a general standard for apportioning
receipts from depletable mineral assets (applicable to trusts in which
the settlor neither grants discretion nor specifies a particular method
for allocating receipts), but also limits on permissible deviations from
77 See note 60 supra.
78 Interview With Mr. H. B. Shultis, Vice President in charge of Trusts, Crocker-
Citizens National Bank, in San Francisco, Oct. 13, 1966.
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that standard within which a trustee may safely operate (applicable
to trusts in which the settlor fails to specify a particular method for
allocating proceeds, but grants discretion to the trustee to so
determine).
When comparing these four standards as to administrative ease,
it is immediately recognized that the present California rule which
directs all receipts to the tenanf 9 is mechanically the least complicated.
When the net receipts are determined, they are simply paid over to
the tenant. Similarly, the unopened mine standard would provide little
difficulty as the receipts are merely credited to the principal account.
This method, however, requires one more step than the open mine
standard as the trustee must pay the interest on the reinvested principal
to the tenant as it accrues.
In analyzing the administrative problems created by the cost
method, it is again useful to examine the income tax provisions per-
taining to depletable mineral assets. By federal law, the operator of
a mineral deposit is permitted to calculate income tax on the proceeds
received by either cost or percentage methods.8 0 However, a percent-
age derived depletion deduction may not be used if it is less than the
allowable deduction as calculated by the cost method.81 Thus, even
if percentage calculations are made, cost depletion must still be cal-
culated for comparison, and since the figures necessary for cost appor-
tionment calculations are identical to those needed for cost depletion
deduction calculations, the trustee would be put to no extra work in
determining the amounts to be distributed to the respective interests.
The percentage standard of the Revised Uniform Principal and
Income Act, however, would present the most difficulty, but the added
mechanical operations would certainly not be sufficient to warrant
a rejection of the standard on this basis alone. The differences between
percentage tax depletion deduction calculations and percentage appor-
tionment calculations would occur only when the mineral was other
than oil or gas, as the Revised Act applies the 27 % standard uni-
formly to all minerals, 2 whereas the allowable percentage for tax
purposes varies with the mineral under consideration. 3 Mechanically
the percentage method would require only that the gross receipts be
multiplied by 271/% and that the product be apportioned to principal,
subject to the proviso that such product be considered equal to 50%
of the net receipts whenever the actual result is greater than that
amount.84
70 CAL. CIv. CODE § 730.11(1).
so INr. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 611.
814 CCH 1967 STAND. FED. TAx RiP. if 3504, at 41,009-10.
82 RLvisa UN'oi.- PINcw,.. A N INcoim AcT § 9(a) (3).
83 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 613.
84 REED UNwomi. PEiNCi:PAL AND INCOm AcT § 9(a)(3).
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It therefore appears that the relatively inconsequential variations
in administrative requirements between the four methods under con-
sideration would constitute a rather arbitrary basis upon which to
choose one method above the others. This also would be a reasonable
conclusion if differentiation were attempted on the basis of the rela-
tive effectiveness of a particular method in establishing limits within
which the trustee could safely operate. It would seem, then, that the
distinguishing factors, if there be any, must lie in the relative abilities
of the respective methods to treat the beneficiaries equitably.
Since the trust device is a means of transferring wealth, it would.
seem reasonable to presume, as pointed out by Professor Richard R. B.
Powell, that a settlor, expressing no contrary desires in the trust in-
strument, would intend that the wasting asset be retained, and that
current receipts be apportioned so that each successive taker could
enjoy the same quantum of wealth. 5 And it. also seems reasonable
that such a policy would treat the successive interests equitably. How-
ever, since apportionment is basically a method for distributing wealth
between beneficiaries, an analysis of the four standards under con-
sideration, in light of the economic factors affecting the trust, should
best serve to illustrate the equitable effectiveness of each.
Before going forward with such an analysis, however, it should be
noted that an equitable distribution of proceeds does not necessarily
mean a per capita distribution. 8 Instead, equitable considerations
relate to the fairness with which the various standards treat the inter-
ests of the beneficiaries. Often, as will be shown infra, fair and equit-
able treatment of the conflicting interests of the successive beneficiaries
can be achieved only through an unequal distribution of proceeds. But
the significance of this last statement depends upon an understanding
of the economic conditions affecting the trust corpus.
It will be observed that the value of a depletable mineral trust
corpus at the time the settlor' creates the trust is based upon two
factors-the estimated number of recoverable units (barrels of oil,
tons of coal, etc.) and the dollar value of the mineral per unit ex-
tracted. But as external economic conditions change, these two factors,
acting together, could produce no less than nine permutations or
combinations: The dollar value of the mineral per unit could remain
constant, and the estimated number of recoverable units could (1)
decrease, (2) increase, or (3) remain constant. The dollar value of the
mineral per unit could decrease, and the estimated number of recover-
able units could (4) decrease, (5) increase, or (6) remain the same.
The dollar value of the mineral per unit could increase, and the esti-
854 POWEL, REAr, PRoPRTY f[ 555, at 347 n.3 (1965).
8 6 Interview with Professor Lewis M. Simes, Hastings College of the Law, in San
Francisco, Dec. 19, 1966.
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mated number of recoverable units could (7) decrease, (8) increase, or
(9) remain constant.
These nine situations, then, represent the possible results from
changes in the external conditions affecting the trust property. It is
to these situations that the trustee must attempt to apply an adminis-
trative policy which is mechanically practical, within the bounds of
the discretionary powers granted him and, at the same time, equitable
to the interests of both present and future beneficiaries.
The Extended Open Mine Standard
It is patently obvious, even to the layman, that a trustee, in choos-
ing to apportion by the extended open mine rule, expressed in Civil
Code section 730.11(1), would unduly favor the tenant at the expense
of the remainderman. When the trustee follows this rule and allocates
all proceeds to the tenant, thereby providing no allowance for deple-
tion, he leaves the remainderman with only the possibility or con-
tingency of enjoying any of the asset left in trust by the settlor. Quite
obviously, the remainderman's possibility of enjoying any of the asset,
no matter which of the nine situations inures, depends upon the
tenant's term expiring before the asset is totally depleted. Although
there has been dicta to the effect that such a standard is justified, based
upon the postulate that the tenant has had a closer relationship with
the settlor than the remainderman and, a fortiori, should receive more
of the settlor's bounty,"" the reasoning seems illogical in light of the
settlor's probable purpose in creating the trust. If the settlor had really
intended that the tenant have the entire proceeds, it would seem that
he would have so stipulated in the trust instrument, or, in the alterna-
live, would have created a legal estate without impeachment for waste
with remainder over. When a trust is created, especially one granting
the trustee discretionary powers with respect to the determination of
principal and income, it is reasonable to presume that the settlor did
not intend that the tenant should take all the proceeds, but that the
same should be apportioned between the successive takers.8 Even in
trusts in which the settlor neither specified a method of allocation nor
granted the trustee discretion with respect to such matters, apportion-
ment by the extreme policy of the extended open mine doctrine seems
unwarranted and unjust.
The Unopened Mine Standard
The unopened mine rule, on the other hand, appears to tip the
scales of equity to the opposite extreme. By apportioning all proceeds
to principal, this rule limits the tenant's income to only the interest
gained on reinvestment. The inequities in such a policy are more fully
87Estate of Miller, 230 Cal. App. 2d 888, 41 Cal. Rptr. 410 (1964).
88 See 4 Powm., BRA PRoErY f 555, at 347 n.3 (1965).
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revealed when it is recognized that the total proceeds include not only
the allowance for depletion and maintenance of the corpus, but also
the excess above this amount which by traditional definitions is income
and, as such, seemingly distributable to the income beneficiary. In all
nine situations outlined above, this policy would discriminate against
the tenant, allowing him only the usual trust investment return of
5-7%,89 and this only on the reinvested, converted corpus. Thus this
approach is somewhat analogous to the policy applied by trustees who
are under a duty to convert a wasting trust asset.f0
However, as in the case of the open mine rule, the standard must
also be considered with regard to the settlor's overlying purpose in
creating the trust. Here again it would seem that if the settlor did not
intend that the wasting asset be retained, he would have so stated in
the trust instrument. Without such statement, and with an accompany-
ing grant of discretion concerning the allocation of proceeds, an appli-
cation of the unopened mine standard (or for that matter, the open
mine standard), would indeed seem inconsistent with an equitable
treatment of the beneficiaries-the basic principle dictating that pro-
ceeds be apportioned.
The Cost Standard
More in line with this principle, however, would seem to be the
cost standard of apportionment, for, as noted above, it provides for
a pro rata recovery of the original capital outlay over the productive
life of the wasting asset. 1 If the value factor and unit factor which
determine the situation facing the trustee were to remain constant,
application of a cost standard would quite obviously segregate the
proceeds from the exploitation of the wasting asset into principal and
income in consonance with the traditional definitions of each. Such
a standard would therefore apportion receipts so as to provide that
each successive taker enjoy the same quantum of wealth. This same
result also obtains when the controlling factors operate so as to offset
one another.
While maintaining the corpus as per the time of creation appears
to do equity to the interests of the present and future beneficiaries
when neither the unit nor the value factor changes, or when the factors
act in opposition, such would seem not to be the case when one of
the factors increases and the other remains the same, or when both
increase. In these latter situations the cost method will maintain the
corpus as it was at the creation of the trust, but will not provide for
89 Interview With Mr. H. B. Shultis, Vice President in charge of Trusts, Crocker-
Citizens National Bank, in San Francisco, Oct 13, 1966.
90 See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 730.12.
P1 See note 71 supra.
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an equitable apportionment of the enhanced value. This is especially
noticeable where it is possible to amortize the original worth of the
trust corpus and still have an income production, for example, where
the settlor buys land at non-mineral bearing land prices and after the
creation of the trust the mineral content of the land is discovered, thus
greatly enhancing the value of the corpus. By strict application of the
cost method, only the original investment of the settlor will be
amortized for the remaindermen.
In Estate of Sloan,92 a case of discovery after creation, the court
held that the receipts from the newly discovered mineral deposits
should be apportioned between principal and income. While the deci-
sion is sound in light of the hypothesis of the court, it would appear
that the reasoning is somewhat obtuse. The court recognized that the
trust corpus was considered of nominal value at the time of creation.
They justified application of the proceeds to principal, however, by
suggesting that the great value of the trust always existed, but simply
was not recognized until discovery. Since the value always existed,
the court felt that the principal must be calculated with respect to it-
any depletion of this new corpus principal being termed a frustration
of the fundamental purpose of the trust. The court here seemingly lost
sight of the basic principle that proceeds be apportioned so as to treat
the interests of present and future beneficiaries equitably, and instead
based its decision on a fiction in order to achieve an equitable result
since a strict application of the cost method would unduly favor the
remainderman.
While this was a case of an after discovered asset, the same poten-
tial inequities would hold if the asset were merely found to be signifi-
cantly larger than estimated at creation or of significantly greater
worth per unit. It would seem, then, that to be consistent with the
policy underlying apportionment, the enhanced value of the corpus
must also be apportioned. Attempting to do so by the cost standard,
however, would necessitate setting up a fictitious basis for depletion,
based upon the enhanced value of the corpus. Obviously, this would
increase the mechanical difficulties as the cost method tax depletion
deduction calculations would no longer be the same as the apportion-
ment calculations.
The Percentage Standard
However, the desired equitable apportionment in the enhanced
value situations would seem to be accomplished without the undesir-
able added mechanical operations by an application of the percentage
standard of the Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act. Where
92222 Cal. App. 2d 283, 35 Cal. Rptr. 167 (1963).
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the settlor neither knew of nor provided for the contingency of en-
hanced value, the percentage standard would appear more equitable
since the overplus would be apportioned between tenant and re-
mainderman,98 giving the remainderman the possibility of taking up
to a maximum of 50% of the net returns. Since the percentage standard
by nature apportions both principal and part of income to corpus,94 it
should more nearly approximate a hypothetical cost type distribution,
based on the enhanced value, than would apportionment by the cost
method based upon the original capital outlay, and would therefore
solve the problem facing the court in the Sloan case without unduly
discriminating against the tenanut.
However, while the percentage standard appears to be an equit-
able method of allocating receipts when the external conditions are
such as to enhance the value of the corpus,95 it would seem to unduly
favor the remainderman when the factors stay constant or operate in
opposition. The same reasons which allow the standard to be applied
in the enhanced value situations would tend to bar its application
where there is little or no change in the value of the corpus. Since the
percentage method allocates both principal and part of income to the
amortization fund, it would allow an inequitable distribution of pro-
ceeds between the successive takers. It would therefore be in conflict
with the traditional definitions of principal and income.
SYNTHESIS
Comparing the percentage standard with the other three stan-
dards considered above, the extended open mine, the unopened
mine, and the cost standard, it is readily apparent that none of the
methods provide an equitable distribution of the proceeds under all
of the situations which might possibly face the trustee. In tabular
form the results of an application of the various methods to the nine
different situations facing the trustee could be summarized as follows:
Legend: Same indicates no relative change in the factor since trust creation.
Up or down indicates the direction of significant change in a factor
since creation of the trust.
T indicates an operation favoring the tenant.
* indicates an operation favoring the remainderman.
N indicates an operation favoring neither beneficiary.
98 See ibid.
94 See Borden, Taxation of Mineral Properties, in EcoNow.ncs OF THm MINERAL
INDusTams 463 (2d ed. Robie 1964); Freeman, Per Centage Depletion For Oil: A Policy
Issue, 30 IND. L.J. 399 (1954).
95 The value of a wasting mineral asset will appear to be enhanced when either




Estimated Open Unopened Per-
Situation Value Units Mine Mine Cost centage
1 same down UNPRODUCTIVE*
2 same up T R T N
3 same same T R N R
4 down down UNPRODUCTIVE*
5 down up T R N R
6 down same UNPRODUCTIVE*
7 up down T R N R
8 up up T R T N
9 up same T R T N
*When the value of a trust corpus substantially decreases, the corpus is termed
unproductive and is administered accordingly. See CAL. Civ. CoDa § 730.13.
The above table, however, does shed some light on the problem of
determining the proper standard of allocation. As the table indicates,
a combination of the cost and percentage standards would tend to
favor neither the present interest at the expense of the future nor the
future at the expense of the present. If the cost method were applied
in situations where the value and unit factors operate in opposition,
or remain the same, neither beneficiary would seem to be prejudiced.
On the other hand, if the percentage standard were applied where
either or both of the factors increase thereby causing the value of the
corpus to be enhanced, the proceeds would appear to be distributed
without prejudice to either of the beneficiaries.
These observations, then, suggest that a flexible standard would
be the proper standard for apportioning receipts from a wasting
mineral trust corpus, as it would allow the trustee to adjust his ad-
ministrative policy to fit the situation with which he is confronted in
order to fulfill the settlor's overlying purpose. And it will be remem-
bered that a desire for increased flexibility is precisely one of the
main factors influencing a settlor to grant discretionary powers to a
trustee with respect to the determination and distribution of principal
and income.96 In order to gain the full advantages of the decisions
of a trustee, it would seem, as pointed out above, that not only must
there be a general standard, but also limits on permissible deviations
therefrom.
Since the percentage standard compensates for the inequities of
the cost standard in situations where the corpus has increased in value
due to external changes in conditions affecting the trust property, it
would seem to be a reasonable upper limit on the exercise of discre-
tion by the trustee. Furthermore, the percentage specified by the
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act would seem to be a reason-
96 See note 29 supra.
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able quantitative upper limit because it would include all allowable-
tax depletion deduction percentages,"" and would permit the trustee
to apportion by the percentage applicable to the particular asset com-
prising his trust corpus and thereby eliminate a duplication of mechan-
ical operations. While-the 27 % standard as proposed by-the Revised
Act is derived from the patently arbitrary standard of the internal
revenue oil depletion allowance, it would seem no less desirable than
any other percentage which might be chosen. In fact, with mineral
fuels comprising 64% of the dollar value of minerals extracted in
California, 8 and most probably a similar majority of the dollar value
of minerals held in trust, it would seem desirable to adopt the 27/2%
standard as the upper limit on permissible discretionary conduct by
the trustee clothed with such powers.
While the percentage standard of the R~evised Act appears to be
a desirable upper limitation on the permissible conduct of the trustee
given discretionary powers concerning the distribution of proceeds, it
in no way establishes or indicates what should be the lower limit. On
the-surface, the obvious choice would be the cost standard, however,
when a longer look is taken, the usefulness of extending the lower
limit on the trustee's discretion to the present California standard of
the extended open mine rule is readily perceived. That such should
be a proper lower limit would seem to be supported by the following:
First, it would appear that application of such a standard of apportion-
ment would work no injustice in situations where the tenant could
not appreciably deplete the trust corpus during his term either because
the tenant has a short life expectancy, or the corpus is extremely large,
etc. This would seem equitable since the remainderman would be left
with the bulk of the corpus, which, because it has not been appreciably
depleted, retains the ability not only to be converted but also to
produce income from further exploitation. Of course as the number of
remaindermen increases, or as the corpus begins to appreciably de-
plete, the trustee could vary the policy toward the upper limit of the
percentage standard and thereby again bring equity into the distribu-
tion of receipts to the conflicting interests of the tenant and the
remainderman.
Obviously, these limits would not bind the settlor who wished to
provide for a different method of allocation of receipts in the trust
document. They would, however, eliminate the qualitative limits
placed on the discretion granted a trustee through judicial construc-
tion of the particular words modifying the grant. This would seem to
be a desirable result since the trustee would know that his decisions,
"if in good faith and according to his best judgment... [would] be
97 See INT. Rfv. CoDe or 1954, § 613.
98 California Div. of Mines & Geology, California's Mineral Industry, 1964, 19:1
Mineral Information Service 8-9 (Jan. 1966) (prepared by the U.S. Bureau of Mines).
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conclusive, irrespective of whether ... [they] be in accordance with
the determination which the court having jurisdiction would have
made."90 But because of the vagueness of the phrases "good faith" and
"best judgment," it might even be advisable to carry the provision of
conclusiveness a step further and find the trustee's decisions unassail-
able within the allowed limits except when there is fraud, misrepresenta-
tion, or some similar wrongful act. The establishment of the definite
limits within which the trustee could safely operate would then hope-
fully eliminate whatever conservative, self-protective tendencies a
trustee might have and instead spur him to exercise his discretion so
as to provide the optimum fulfillment of the settlor's purpose and
intent in granting discretionary powers.
CONCLUSION
It would appear, then, that the questions posed by the Bixby 10
decision must be directed to the legislature for final resolution. If the
court was attempting to adopt judicially the standard proposed by the
Revised Uniform Principal and Income Act as a new standard of ap-
portionment for California, they were not only invading the province
of the legislature, but also apparently ignoring the frailties of that
standard. While the standard does provide a simple convenient method
of trust administration, it is no simpler in operation than the extended
open mine rule, the unopened mine rule, or the cost standard. Al-
though none of the last three standards or the percentage standard
effectively establishes permissible areas within which the trustee may
safely operate, such limits could be inferred from the Bixby decision
if it is viewed as placing an upper limit on the quantitative discretion
which the trustee may exercise. More properly, however, the Bixby
case should be viewed as a judicial approval of the 27 / standard
only with respect to the particular facts involved, but, quite obviously,
such a conclusion would also be begging the question. The decision,
however, has shown that the present standard which allows the tenant
to take all the proceeds from the exploitation of the wasting mineral
asset can give rise to gross inequities when the nature of the trust
corpus and the basic principles dictating apportionment of receipts
are considered. The decision should therefore be a stimulus to the
legislature to reconsider the present statutory method of apportion-
ment in California and attempt to formulate a policy which in operation
would be more consistent with the equitable treatment of both the
present and future beneficiaries and more consistent with a fulfillment
of the general intent of the settlor in attempting to distribute his wealth
via the trust device.
9 CAL. Crv. CODE § 730.04.
100 Estate of Bixby, 55 Cal. 2d 819, 13 Cal. Rptr. 411, 362 P.2d 43 (1961).
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